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 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
 VOLUME 51 DECEMBER 1991 NUMBER 4
 Land Rents and Agricultural
 Productivity: The Paris Basin,
 1450-1789
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN
 Using evidence from leases and price series, this article examines the total factor
 productivity of farming in the Paris Basin between 1450 and 1789. Existing
 evidence about productivity is unreliable, the article argues, and the leases
 provide historians with a new and valuable source for the study of productivity
 and economic growth. The article defends the methods used with the leases,
 which point to spurts of noteworthy growth on local farms but also to setbacks
 during times of war and increased taxation. It concludes with an analysis of the
 causes of economic growth in preindustrial agriculture.
 Like many other religious institutions in early modern France, the
 Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris owned a staggering amount of
 agricultural property-in particular, scores of farms and parcels of land
 scattered throughout the Paris Basin. The cathedral's papers, housed
 today in the National Archives, describe these holdings, record the
 sometimes poignant details of their management, and preserve the
 leases that tenants agreed to, typically every nine years. As one might
 expect, the documents are voluminous. The index alone, compiled by
 an obsessive eighteenth-century archivist, comprises 30 manuscript
 volumes, and for property after property one encounters strings of
 leases running from the late Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth
 century.
 Such agricultural leases have been profitably employed by a number
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 of enterprising historians.1 Yet most have been content to use them to
 study landlords' revenues or to assess the burden placed on the
 peasantry. A few researchers, it is true, have attempted to derive an
 index of agricultural output from series of leases, but they have done so
 apologetically, as the documents seemed a poor substitute for the
 records of the tithe.
 What historians have not realized, though, is that leases can shed
 considerable light on agricultural productivity. Under the proper con-
 ditions, evidence from leases can be combined with product prices and
 factors-of-production costs to give a measure of productivity. This
 measure of productivity is not merely the partial productivity of land or
 of labor, but total factor productivity (TFP), the ratio of outputs to inputs
 that takes into account all the factors of production used in farming: land,
 labor, and capital. Agriculture leases have previously been employed in
 this way to study the productivity of early modern English agriculture, and
 though using them may at first seem a picaresque adventure in pseudosta-
 tistics, they ultimately furnish us with firmer evidence than the shaky
 figures we have for crop yields and output per worker. And it is
 evidence of considerable importance, for it reveals whether agriculture
 was in fact shackled by organizational and technological rigidities, as so
 many historians believe, or whether, even under the Old Regime,
 certain farms could extract more output from the same amount of land,
 labor, and capital and thereby achieve economic growth.
 What follows is an analysis of 809 leases gathered from the archives
 of the Cathedral of Notre Dame for the period between 1450 and 1789.
 The leases form 39 series, each one concerning a separate property in
 one of 25 different villages scattered throughout the Paris Basin (Figure
 1). The properties lay on the average a little less than 40 kilometers from
 Paris, the closest only 5 kilometers and the farthest 96 kilometers from
 the city center. Most were rented along with only minor rights to collect
 the local tithe or local seigniorial dues, and none changed significantly in
 size. (If the size did change appreciably, I began another series of leases
 for what I considered to be a different holding.) As a whole, the
 properties ranged from a minuscule plot measuring only 0.26 hectare
 (roughly two-thirds of an acre) to an enormous farm of 278 hectares, or
 roughly 700 acres; they averaged 67 hectares. As one might expect, they
 were devoted overwhelmingly to grain production: only 1.4 percent of
 the land was vineyard and 4.8 percent natural meadow.2
 Nearly all the leases were intended to last nine years. Among the most
 1 For the Paris region alone, there are a number of excellent studies using leases: Veyrassat-
 Herren and Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere"; Desaive, "A la recherche d'un indicateur";
 Postel-Vinay, La rente fonciere; Jacquart, "La rente fonciere"; and the contributions by Bdaur
 and Constant in Prestations paysannes.
 2 The sources include the index to the actes capitulaires de la cathe'drale de Paris in Archives
 Nationales (henceforth AN) LL 319-50/51 and the original leases, property descriptions, and land
 management records in AN S 123-462. J. P. Desaive was the first to use AN LL 319-50/51 as a
 source for leases; I have gone over this index myself and I have also consulted all of the
 corresponding original documents in AN S 123-462. All averages here are calculated counting each
 lease separately; weighting each property by its area would not change the results appreciably.
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 FIGURE 1
 LOCATION OF PROPERTIES IN THE NOTRE DAME SAMPLE
 ancient-those dating to the early sixteenth century or before-a few
 were drawn up for longer periods or even for the life of the tenant. Far
 more common, though, were leases brought to a premature end because
 of a tenant's death or bankruptcy. Given such interruptions, it is not
 surprising that the lease series do not run unbroken from 1450 to 1789,
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 17 Mar 2016 23:36:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 774 Hoffman
 monotonously casting up a new contract every nine years. Some of the
 series did not begin until well after 1450; others terminated when
 properties changed. And in several instances leases proved unusable.
 Still, the series I ended up with seem nearly continuous: between the
 first and the last usable contract for each property in the sample, the
 gaps between leases average 9.4 years.
 The sample, is of course, not random-few of the properties lie west
 of Paris-but it does seem representative of open-field agriculture near
 the city. It also lets us track a large number of identical properties over
 long periods of time, something previous researchers have never
 accomplished. The sample has another advantage as well: we know
 each property's characteristics-the area, the location, the nature of the
 crops, the identity of the tenant, and so on. We can therefore relate
 variations in agricultural productivity to those characteristics and do so
 more precisely than ever before. In the end, the sample paints a
 somewhat startling picture of an agriculture capable of spurts of
 considerable growth, at least in the charmed environs of Paris, and it
 helps us discern, more precisely than in the past, the causes of growth
 and stagnation under the Old Regime.
 LAND RENTS
 The first step toward assessing productivity, a step interesting in its
 own right, is to survey the trend of nominal land rents. Table 1 presents
 rent averages from the sample for each decade from 1450 to 1789.3 Most
 authors limit themselves to simple averages, but because rent depended
 on land quality and location, I have also adjusted the averages for
 variations in quality as properties jump in and out of the sample.
 Columns 2 and 4 display the results of the adjustment, which uses a
 regression of ln(rent) on property characteristics and other variables
 affecting rent.4
 The net adjustment is relatively minor and does not affect the overall
 trend in land rent. Other methods of correcting for quality differences
 3 For a detailed account of how I treated in-kind payments, pots-de-vin, contre-lettres, rent
 understatement, charges, and a host of related problems, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix
 1. Compare with Jacquart, "La rente fonciere"; and Beaur, Le march foncier, pp. 231-46.
 4 The relevant property characteristics included soil quality; presence of natural meadow and
 vineyard, as meadow was scarce and vineyards entailed capital investment; surface area, as large
 properties typically rented for less; and distance from Paris, which measured the costs of
 transportation to the major market in the region. Ideally, one would want to have in the regressions
 a measure of the cost of shipping crops to Paris by the cheapest means available-overland for
 properties close to Paris, and by river for more distant properties, where the economies of river
 transport overtook the added costs of shipping crops to a river port and then loading them onto
 boats. For our properties, however, the shipping costs, as is shown in Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendix 2, were nearly perfectly correlated with simple distance. The quality-adjustment
 regression also included dummy variables for the devastating war years of the League and its
 immediate aftermath; for the late eighteenth century, when rents seemed to rise; for repeat tenants,
 because historians believe they depressed the rent; and a time trend, to capture the effects of
 inflation and changing prices. Only the property-attribute terms, not the time-attribute terms, were
 used in adjusting the rents for quality. See Table 1 and Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 3, for
 details.
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 TABLE 1
 NOMINAL RENT (LIVRES/HECTARE) AND AGRICULTURAL PRICE-COST INDEX
 Nominal Rent Price-Cost
 Leases In(Rent) Index
 Decade in Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 1450-1459 2 0.70 0.76 0.57 -0.29
 1460-1469 3 0.72 0.80 0.67 -0.23
 1470-1479 3 0.73 0.94 0.62 -0.07
 1480-1489 4 0.68 0.69 0.79 -0.69 -
 1490-1499 5 0.94 0.97 0.81 -0.07
 1500-1509 4 1.23 1.33 0.98 0.28 -
 1510-1519 6 1.74 1.76 1.40 0.50
 1520-1529 11 2.14 2.24 1.82 0.57 0.62
 1530-1539 14 3.01 2.96 2.23 0.79 0.69
 1540-1549 13 3.66 4.12 3.11 1.36 0.72
 1550-1559 20 5.07 5.15 4.72 1.58 0.74
 1560-1569 13 6.55 7.34 5.86 1.92 0.77
 1570-1579 23 9.09 8.74 7.28 1.99 0.86
 1580-1589 24 12.43 10.98 10.40 2.27 0.81
 1590-1599 26 12.02 12.86 11.92 2.13 1.14
 1600-1609 31 12.81 11.64 10.53 2.21 0.95
 1610-1619 35 10.85 11.05 8.96 2.25 0.87
 1620-1629 38 13.54 13.16 11.61 2.35 0.96
 1630-1639 38 20.78 20.26 15.79 2.84 1.19
 1640-1649 32 20.91 20.54 17.40 2.83 1.05
 1650-1659 27 23.07 22.28 19.14 2.84 1.22
 1660-1669 33 26.42 26.53 19.55 3.11 1.13
 1670-1679 25 18.78 17.92 17.12 2.79 0.95
 1680-1689 24 19.92 19.75 15.88 2.86 1.04
 1690-1699 26 21.27 21.58 17.49 2.96 1.10
 1700-1709 35 25.44 23.97 20.83 3.06 1.06
 1710-1719 31 23.79 23.54 19.12 3.06 1.12
 1720-1729 30 30.34 27.81 20.55 3.24 1.07
 1730-1739 32 25.01 23.35 22.17 3.10 1.09
 1740-1749 32 25.73 25.29 19.03 3.17 1.16
 1750-1759 29 27.41 27.14 21.20 3.25 1.12
 1760-1769 27 31.90 28.95 23.75 3.32 1.12
 1770-1779 19 43.74 43.07 32.44 3.73 1.32
 1780-1789 30 49.46 47.91 38.40 3.83 1.16
 Notes: Column I is the average rent for the leases in the sample; column 2 is the average of
 quality-adjusted rent for the leases in the sample; column 3 is the area-weighted average of
 quality-adjusted rent for all leases in force; column 4 is the average of quality-adjusted In(rent) for
 the leases in the sample; and column 5 is the agricultural price-cost index (mean equals 1). The
 quality adjustments rely on regression 1 in Table 2 and begin by correcting In(rent) lease by lease.
 Column 4 is the decennial average of the following: z = In(rent) - alxl - a2X2 - a3,x3 - a4x4 - a5X5,
 where a1 through a5 are the coefficients of percentage meadow, percentage vineyard, good soil,
 In(distance to Paris), and In(area) in Table 2, regression 1; and xl through X5 are the corresponding
 variables measured as deviations from their means. The variable z is quality-adjusted In(rent);
 because the quality adjustment is linear, we would get the same answer if we first averaged In(rent)
 over each decade and then applied the quality adjustment. Column 2 is the decennial average of ez
 for each lease; because exponentiation is not linear, column 2 will not be precisely the same as what
 we would get by exponentiating the values in column 4. Column 3 averages the area-weighted rent
 for all the leases in force; it involves the same quality adjustment, except that x, through X5 are now
 measured as area-weighted averages. Column 5 is !, the ratio of agricultural prices to the costs of
 C
 the factors of production other than land, where each price and each cost is weighted by its share
 in total revenue. Shares are from the Bernonville farm. See Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendices
 1, 3, 6, and 9 for details.
 Sources: Sample of leases; other sources are listed in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 14.
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 have an equally small effect. So too does averaging the rent in a different
 way: weighting all the leases in force in each year by area, under the
 assumption that each lease remained valid for nine years or until
 renewed (Table 1, column 3). The difference with the second method is
 that it weights leases by area and counts not only leases signed in a given
 year but all those from previous years that remain binding.
 The only discrepancy between the two methods appears when crises
 strike or when rents are growing. During crises, averaging over all the
 leases in force exaggerates somewhat the rent that was actually paid;
 during rent inflation, it lags behind the true value of the land. The
 difference may of course seem small, but it can disturb the calculation
 of productivity, which requires an up-to-date figure for rent-ideally,
 what land would fetch if leased to the highest bidder. Given the slight
 problems with averaging over all the leases in force, I therefore eschew
 it in favor of the average over the leases in the sample-that is, only the
 leases signed in any period. In other words, columns 2 and 4 in Table 1
 are preferred to column 3.5
 This rental series, it turns out, matches the evidence unearthed by
 other historians. Plotting the numbers in Table 1, column 2 against the
 figures for the outskirts of Paris published by Beatrice Veyrassat-
 Herren and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie yields startling agreement
 (Figure 2). The same chorus of agreement rings out in a comparison of
 this evidence with other series from the seventeenth and eighteenth
 centuries.6 Although the similarity perhaps detracts from the novelty of
 my numbers, it lends credence to what they say and in particular to what
 they reveal about productivity.
 USING LEASES AND PRICES TO MEASURE PRODUCTIVITY
 Today we can easily measure the productivity of agricultural labor by
 dividing the quantities of goods produced by the number of workers.
 Performing a similar computation for the Old Regime, however, is a
 hopeless undertaking; even though it has been attempted, the results
 seem dubious. The problem is determining the size of the agricultural
 labor force, a calculation that, even when based on nineteenth-century
 census records, is fraught with difficulty. How does one know what
 5 For a discussion, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 3.
 6 Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere." Because these scholars deflated
 their rent series, I multiplied their figures by the moving average wheat price that they used for
 deflation. Other ways of comparing the two series led to similar results. See Hoffman, "Land
 Rents," appendix 4, for details. For other local rent figures that parallel ours, see Bdaur, Le marched
 foncier, pp. 262-68; Jacquart, La crise rurale, pp. 616, 638, 699; and Bertrandy-Lacabane,
 Bretigny-sur-Orge, pp. 314-15.
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 fraction of the rural population worked in farming when many denizens
 of the countryside toiled in cottage industry?7
 It is equally difficult to trace the evolution of the productivity of land.
 To be sure, we can derive grain yields from a variety of documents, and
 the yields measure the productivity of land used in grain farming. The
 problem is that the French evidence is always scanty, making compar-
 isons of yields over time a treacherous venture. Grain output per
 hectare varied drastically from year to year and from one end of a farm
 to another, casting doubt on any comparison between, say, a sixteenth-
 century yield taken from a lone probate description of a particular field
 and a nineteenth-century yield calculated from a census average for the
 surrounding arrondissement. Worse, even seemingly reliable averages
 can be deceiving. If wheat supplants crops of lesser value (such as rye)
 7 Postel-Vinay, "A la recherche de la revolution dconomique"; and Bompard, Magnac, and
 Postel-Vinay, "Emploi, mobility et chomage en France."
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 on poorer soil, then average yields for wheat can stagnate or decline,
 even though the value of output per hectare and physical yields
 themselves (on soil of a given quality) are rising.8
 If following grain yields over the centuries seems intractable, one
 might hope (as many historians have) that the tithe could be used to
 track land productivity, provided that it was levied on fields of a fixed
 size. One serious but largely unacknowledged problem, though, is that
 the tithe series are likely to omit output from innovations such as
 artificial meadows and from new crops such as turnips. The large
 ecclesiastical institutions whose tithe series historians favor often lost
 their tithe rights when land was planted with new crops. A flat graph of
 the tithe derived from such records could easily mask growing produc-
 tivity and thus gravely mislead us.9
 We therefore cannot easily compute labor productivity or extend
 yields and other measures of land productivity back into the past. And
 none of those figures gives us total factor productivity: even when
 reliable, they furnish only partial productivities of land or of labor and
 usually only for a single crop, such as wheat. What of agricultural
 capital and the other factors of production? And what of the farm
 products that the tithe series skip, such as wool or meat, which were far
 from negligible even in grain-growing regions? What we need, of course,
 is a new source of information, preferably one that lets us measure not
 just the productivity of one output or of one factor but total factor
 productivity.
 That is what the leases allow us to do. When combined with prices
 and wages, the rental values in the leases yield a measure of total factor
 productivity that, while itself open to objections, seems much more
 reliable than the dubious physical measures of output per worker or
 even output per hectare. Using prices and rental figures in this way was
 first suggested by Donald McCloskey, in an analysis of English enclo-
 sures. More recently, Robert Allen has successfully employed the same
 8 For difficulties with comparisons of yields, see Meuvret, Subsistances, vol. 1, pt. I (Texte), pp.
 207-11. The best-known attempt to compare French yields is Morineau's Les faux-semblants d'un
 demarrage economique. One might object that productivity figures calculated from leases would
 also vary drastically from year to year and place to place, but there are so many leases over which
 we can average that the problem is less severe than it seems. Furthermore, with the leases we can
 at least follow the same properties over time and thus control for differences in land quality,
 something never done with French yields.
 9 In 1603, for example, the canons of Notre Dame went to court because they were unable to
 collect the tithe on land recently put into cultivation and sown with turnips in the village of
 Louvres. In 1713 to 1716 they lost the tithe on new artificial meadows in the village of Dampmart
 to the local cure. In these examples, the sort of tithe records historians use-records of large
 ecclesiastical institutions such as Notre Dame-might even show a decline in the tithe at a time of
 agricultural improvements because (as was often the case) the tithe rights to new crops belonged
 to the cure. See AN LL 327-28, fols. 12-17; LL 331, fols. 210-50.
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 method to examine the productivity of enclosures and of English
 agriculture in general in the early modern period.10
 What McCloskey and Allen relied on was the fact that total factor
 productivity can be calculated with prices and rents in place of the
 actual physical measurements of the products and factors of production.
 The definition of TFP here is a standard one. It gauges the effectiveness
 of farm production and is defined-roughly speaking-as the average
 product of all the inputs to farming. Its rate of change equals the speed
 at which farm production is growing less the rate at which use of the
 factors of production is increasing, with each product weighted by its
 share in total revenue and each factor by its share in total cost. In
 mathematical terms, the rate of growth of TFP is
 m n n m
 EUi ~i - Ei ijj= j, E u*ipUi(1)
 i= 1 j= 1 1= 1 i- 1
 Here the yi's are the outputs produced; the pi's and us's are the
 corresponding output prices and output shares in total revenue; the xj's,
 the factors of production used; the wj's and vj's, the corresponding
 factor prices and factor shares in total cost; and dots refer to growth
 rates. The expression on the left is simply the definition of TFP
 measured in terms of physical units of inputs and outputs; under
 conditions specified below, it will equal the expression on the right,
 which is measured in terms of prices.
 If we also assume, as Allen does, that the product and factor shares
 remain constant over time (an assumption that turns out to be very
 reasonable for early modern agriculture), then we can integrate equation
 1 to get a formula for TFP:
 WIVI ... W Vn C
 TFP = u U = (r + t) (2)
 Here r is per hectare nominal rent; t is per hectare taxes; s is the factor
 share of land; C is a geometric index of the costs of the other factors of
 production weighted by their factor shares; and P is a geometric index
 of the price of agricultural products weighted by their shares in total
 revenue. We have made the reasonable assumption that the burden of
 taxation falls on land, so that the cost of land equals rent plus taxes, or
 (r + t). In nonmathematical terms, TFP is high if a property manages to
 support high rent and taxes despite high costs for the other factors of
 production and low product prices.1"
 To calculate TFP, it thus suffices to know product and factor shares,
 0 McCloskey, "The Economics of Enclosure"; and Allen, "Efficiency."
 " The definition of TFP is from Chambers, Applied Production Analysis, pp. 235-39. For a
 derivation of equations 1 and 2, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 5.
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 the prices of agricultural products, and the cost of the various factors of
 production, including land. We can measure TFP either as a weighted
 ratio of output quantities produced divided by factor quantities utilized,
 or, equivalently, as a weighted ratio of factor costs divided by product
 prices. The point is that more efficient techniques and organization not
 only increase physical outputs for a given level of inputs but also
 depress product prices relative to factor costs and ultimately show up in
 the form of higher profits and rents, once we correct for the variation in
 prices and wages via the indexes P and C. If a clever farmer discovers
 how to increase his productivity-perhaps he manages to squeeze more
 wheat from the same plot of land, the same amount of capital, and the
 same amount of toil-then he will reap higher profits as well, profits that
 will eventually fund higher rent payments to his landlord. If others
 imitate him, the price of wheat may fall, but TFP, which is a weighted
 ratio of factor costs divided by product prices, still increases. On the
 other hand, a mere shift in rents, wages, and prices in response to
 population change or price inflation will not affect TFP. If the population
 increases, for example, rents may rise relative to agricultural prices
 while wages fall. Yet the index of TFP, if properly calculated, will
 remain the same.12
 WHAT THE METHOD OF CALCULATING TFP ASSUMES
 The whole method of calculating TFP is open to certain objections, of
 course. Some are technical and are discussed elsewhere. 13 More
 important and far more interesting are the assumptions underlying the
 whole exercise, which may evoke a few howls of execration from
 economists and historians alike: that the agricultural cost and product
 shares can be described with some precision for a period of three
 centuries, that agricultural markets existed, and that the land rental
 market was competitive. These assumptions obviously deserve detailed
 scrutiny.
 The first is that we know the agricultural technology well enough to
 calculate the factor and product shares that enter into the formula for
 TFP. One might suppose that the shares could be recovered from clever
 regressions with rents, prices, and wages, but such a tactic is doomed to
 12 Imagine, for example, that a growing population drove wages down relative to agricultural
 prices and pushed rents up, while TFP remained constant. The cost index C would decline relative
 to the price index P, while rent and hence (r + t) rose, but the change in rent would be just enough
 to compensate for the change in prices and wages, leaving TFP = (r + t)SCIP constant. Note that
 measuring the prices here either in money of account, as I have done, or in precious metal would
 yield the same answer for TFP and for its rate of change. Converting prices to silver, for instance,
 would simply multiply the numerator and the denominator in equation 2 by the same number,
 because the product and factor shares sum to 1. TFP would thus be unchanged.
 13 See Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 5.
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 failure even with the most drastic simplifications. 14 The alternative is to
 derive the shares from the records of a typical farm in the region. I have
 done so for the farm of Bernonville, located some 150 kilometers north
 of Paris near the town of Saint-Quentin. When its accounts for the year
 1765 were published in 1767, Bernonville was described as an average
 large farm, by no means exceptional. And although it lay farther from
 Paris than any of the properties in the Notre Dame sample, its
 technology differed little from what one finds elsewhere in the grain-
 growing regions of the Paris Basin. In the Brie, to the southeast of Paris,
 in the Beauce, to the southwest, on the plains north of the city, and to
 its immediate south, farmers grew the same crops, hired similar
 numbers of workers, and used nearly the same number of animals-and
 their farm accounts yielded similar product and factor shares. In
 Bernonville, for instance, 80 percent of the revenue came from grain
 crops; on a farm in the Brie in the 1730s, 77 percent did. The factor share
 of land in Bernonville was 27 percent; in the Brie, 31 percent. And on
 another farm, located some 20 kilometers north of Paris and investi-
 gated by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau, the numbers are much
 the same.15
 Factor and product shares thus seem to have varied little from farm to
 farm near Paris, and the Bernonville shares would appear to fit the
 agricultural technology of our sample properties very well, at least in the
 eighteenth century. One might worry, though, that factor and product
 shares changed over time. Modern economic growth has accustomed us
 to increases in the factor share of labor, and in early modern Europe
 whole regions-Western England, for example-were transformed by
 the coming of a pastoral economy, which diminished the product share
 of grain.
 Such was not the case, however, near Paris during the period under
 study. The occasional tenancy contracts we have from other landlords,
 in which tenants paid a portion of the output as rent, point to similar
 factor and product shares in the seventeenth century. Death inventories
 imply that the use of labor and livestock had not changed significantly as
 far back as the sixteenth century. The number of plowmen hired may
 have declined somewhat during the eighteenth century, but the overall
 14 In particular, we might try to deduce the shares from a regression of profits on prices and
 wages. Although we do not know profits directly, we could approximate them by taxes and rents,
 treating land as a fixed factor and assuming that the rental market would equate profits with the rent
 and taxes that are the returns to land. The problem, however, is that if we include a realistic
 number of prices in the regression we run into intractable problems of multicollinearity, which are
 aggravated by the choice of anything but the simplest form for the profit function. On the other
 hand, if we reduce the number of prices, the regression coefficients have the wrong sign because
 of the variables that have been omitted. Differencing the equation and correcting prices for inflation
 do not resolve the problem.
 15 The Bernonville shares included 14 inputs and 13 outputs; see Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendix 6, for details.
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 effect on the labor factor share was small. Furthermore, if the factor
 shares of land and labor had shifted drastically, we should be able to
 detect it from demographic data, but no such shift is apparent-at least
 not before the late eighteenth century.16
 Nor do product shares in total revenue seem to have changed.
 Farmers did plant new crops such as artificial meadows, but the effect
 on the overall proportion of outputs was small. Farmers near Paris had
 specialized in grain production as early as the late Middle Ages; they
 continued to do so into the nineteenth century. What animal products
 they produced-such as wool from the sheep that fertilized the arable-
 derived from grain production, and relative prices never shifted in favor
 of acquiring additional livestock. Indeed, because much specialization
 in early modern Europe was driven by the effect of transportation costs
 on relative prices-farmers hundreds of miles from cities might raise
 easy-to-transport livestock, while those nearby tilled fields of wheat-it
 is no wonder that our farms, all near Paris, never abandoned arable
 farming. 17
 While the assumption of constant product and factor shares appears
 reasonable, it would be prudent to check the sensitivity of the results to
 variations in the share values. To do so, I relied on an alternative set of
 product and factor shares from a farm north of Paris, whose accounts
 have been analyzed by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau.
 Although the Bernonville and the alternative shares resemble one
 another, there are a few differences, for the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau
 farm had specialized to a certain extent in the production of oats.
 Indeed, one might argue that the differences were as great as might be
 expected between any two farms on the outskirts of Paris. Nonetheless,
 as we shall see below, the alternative shares yield similar estimates for
 TFP. 18
 The formula for TFP also assumes the existence of rudimentary
 markets in which the factors of production can be purchased and farm
 products sold. We must be able to measure prices in those markets to
 calculate the indexes C and P in equation 2 for TFP. Not all of a farmer's
 dealings need have passed through the product and factor markets-
 merely a portion. It would not matter, for example, that a farmer
 employed some family members, provided he also hired servants. Nor
 would it matter that he consumed some of his crops, provided he also
 sold a portion. As long as he had some involvement in the markets,
 16 The reason demographic data are useful here is that under constant factor shares the ratio of
 rent to wages will be proportional to the ratio of labor to land, which we can approximate by the
 rural population. For details concerning this and the following paragraph, see Hoffman, "Land
 Rents," appendix 6.
 17 One should not forget the importance of vineyards in certain parts of the Paris Basin; they
 remained important up to the nineteenth century.
 18 For the factor shares from the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau farm, see Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendix 6.
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 though, it would be fair to say that the costs and the prices he faced
 equaled those dictated by the market, once we allowed for the costs of
 transportation and of market preparation.
 Here, obviously, we may raise some historians' hackles, for Old
 Regime farmers are often considered self-sufficient peasants who were
 thoroughly isolated from markets. The evidence, though, suggests that
 self-sufficiency itself was largely a myth. This was certainly the case in
 the Paris Basin. Nearly all the peasants in the region either cultivated
 wine for sale, worked on the side as farm laborers, or rented land in a
 tight land market. By no stretch of the imagination were they self-
 sufficient. 19
 There remains the practical problem of measuring wages. Ideally we
 would like to have the wage of farm labor, preferably unskilled. Farm
 wages, though, are difficult to appraise: domestics were often paid a
 considerable portion of their earnings in kind, and salaries varied from
 season to season and task to task. Even for a given task, the salary range
 could be considerable because of differences in strength and skill. The
 only alternative, it seems, is to use urban wages for unskilled building
 workers. Calculating the mode of the observed wages would capture
 what the average unskilled building worker earned and allow us to
 overcome differences in strength and skill. One might object that urban
 and rural wages were different, but fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
 evidence from the region around Paris suggests that wages for unskilled
 day laborers in the city differed little from those prevalent in the
 countryside, at least during the harvest, when farmers hired day
 laborers from the city. "In the sixteenth century, the wages of two
 laborers, one working in the fields and the other in the city, were
 identical," stated Micheline Baulant, who studied wages around Paris-
 and her data support that assertion. An unskilled urban helper earned
 2.5 sous a day in 1500 to 1505 and 10.4 sous a day in 1594 to 1598; a
 hotteur in the grape harvest earned 2.5 sous in 1500 to 1505 and 10 sous
 in 1594 to 1598.20 Even if there were sometimes differences between city
 and country wages, the trend of pay for the unskilled was nearly
 everywhere the same, and it is that trend, not absolute prices, that we
 need in order to establish changes in our cost index C and thereby in our
 formula for TFP. For nearly all unskilled occupations, both within the
 city and without, wages in cash and in kind moved in parallel-or at
 least this is what the evidence from the Paris region suggests.21
 19 Skeptical readers may consult the lengthy discussion in Hoffman, "Social History and
 Agricultural Productivity."
 20 Baulant, "Prix et salaires"; Fourquin, Les campagnes, p. 496; Goubert, Beauvais, vol. 1, pp.
 139-40, 547-60; and Gutton, Domestiques et serviteurs, pp. 111-17.
 21 Baulant, "Prix et salaires," pp. 980-86; and Baulant, "Le salaire des ouvriers." This is
 sixteenth-century evidence; for evidence for later periods, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix
 7. One might worry that cash and in-kind wages could diverge, but evidence from the eighteenth
 and early nineteenth centuries argues against such divergence. See Labrousse, Esquisse du
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 Of course, we should not jump to the conclusion that a national labor
 market existed. Labor markets were regional, though the one around
 Paris was undoubtedly large enough to embrace the localities from
 which our leases were drawn. Nor should we overlook evidence that the
 labor market was segmented, with farmers in certain places and at
 certain times able to hire cheap labor at a cost that bore only a slight
 relationship to the wages paid in Paris. There is some evidence for such
 segmentation, but it is as yet neither overwhelming nor convincing.
 Differences in remuneration were not large, and they may simply have
 reflected the heterogeneity of labor, the complexities of in-kind pay, and
 variations in the cost of living. And it is difficult to argue for complete
 segmentation in the face of the enormous mobility of labor in the Paris
 Basin during the Old Regime. Parisian workers, we know, helped take
 in the harvest. Domestics quit the farm for the city, as did paupers
 fleeing rural poverty. And whole families moved in and out of the small
 towns surrounding Paris, presumably in search of work. Given such
 mobility, it seems unlikely that the regional labor market was parti-
 tioned into isolated and mutually exclusive compartments.22
 As it does for agricultural labor, my method also requires the
 existence of markets for agricultural capital-in particular, livestock.
 Fortunately, long-distance markets for horses, cattle, and sheep reach
 far back into the past, and though prices series for livestock are skimpy
 and we must be careful of differences between breeds, it is possible to
 assemble the necessary series of cost trends-or at least gross averages
 for 25-year periods, which are all that is necessary for our cost index C
 in the formula for TFP.23
 For the price index P in the formula for TFP, we need prices of
 agriculture outputs, and here it is grain that poses the most daunting
 problems. The price of grain was volatile and therefore difficult to
 measure. Taking long-run averages can adjust for the price volatility,
 but it is not clear over what period we should average. Furthermore, the
 cost of transporting grain was high enough to drive a wedge between the
 farm gate price and the market price that enters into our agricultural
 price index P. If the wedge were large enough, or if it varied consider-
 ably, it could distort our index of TFP.24
 mouvement des prix et des revenus, vol. 2, pp. 455-56, n. 33; and also the examples in my appendix
 7. For the sources of the wages and the prices that enter into the calculation of the indexes C and
 P, see my appendix 14.
 22 See Baulant, "Le salaire des ouvriers," p. 472; Baulant, "Prix et salaires," pp. 980-87;
 Lachiver, La population de Meulan, pp. 91-122; Beaud and Bouchart, "Le dep6t des pauvres,"
 pp. 127-43; Hoffman, "Social History and Agricultural Productivity"; and Hoffman, "Land
 Rents," appendix 7.
 23 Throughout this paper, the price of all capital goods was a rental price, which equaled the sales
 prices multiplied by interest plus depreciation; see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 6, for
 details.
 24 Meuvret, Subsistances, vol. 3. As much grain reached the consumers in the form of in-kind
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 But the difficulties here are far from insurmountable. Although we
 cannot be absolutely certain about what years to average prices over,
 employing the current year and the previous eight (in other words,
 averaging over the outgoing lease) seems concordant with contempo-
 rary practice. We shall therefore calculate P and C using the Bernonville
 shares and Paris prices averaged over the outgoing lease. Table 1
 displays the resulting decennial averages of the price-cost ratio P/C,
 which are all we need to calculate TFP. Of course, we can check the
 sensitivity of our results to this process of averaging by using prices
 from a radically different set of years in the indexes P and C. We shall
 do so, using prices averaged over the life of the new lease-or in other
 words, over the current year and eight years into the future. This
 alternative set of prices makes strong demands of our tenant farmers
 (namely, that they be able to see eight years into the future), but as we
 shall see, it does not change the index of TFP greatly.25
 As for transportation costs, though they drove a wedge between grain
 prices in distant markets, the long-run average price trends-all that is
 necessary for our price index P-tended to move together, as long as the
 markets were not too far apart. Away from Paris, for instance, grain
 prices in local markets were lower and more volatile than within Paris in
 the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries-yet price trends
 in markets as far as 100 kilometers away tended to follow the trend of
 the Paris price, particularly if we examine averages, which smooth out
 local crises. Such parallel movement should hardly be surprising in view
 of the considerable evidence that merchants and large-scale farmers
 carried out what amounted to intermarket arbitrage in the sixteenth,
 seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. With individuals buying and
 selling once price gaps widened, it is no wonder that grain prices, though
 different in absolute terms, exhibited similar trends.26
 The last assumption we need is that untaxed profits from farming
 eventually went to landlords-in other words, that the land rental
 market was competitive, with no barriers to tenant entry. In the short
 run, it is clear, such was not always the case, for it might take a landlord
 time to renew a lease or even to realize that more could be squeezed out
 of a property. What concerns us, though, is the long run. Unlike the
 markets for labor, livestock, and agricultural products, which swarmed
 payments or self-production, one might suppose that the farm gate price of grain bore no
 relationship to the market price, but such was not the case near Paris. On this point, see Hoffman,
 "Land Rents," appendix 8.
 25 See Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 9. Prices were too fragmentary to calculate P/C before
 1520. Decennial averages of the component prices of P and C and alternative versions of the ratio
 PIC are available on request from the author.
 26 Kaplan, Provisioning Paris, pp. 206, 215-16; Jacquart, La rise rurale, pp. 764-66; Dupaquier
 et al., Mercuriales, p. 233; and Baulant and Meuvret, Prix des c&r&ales, vol. 1, pp. 12, 25. As we
 shall discuss, hinterland prices did rise relative to the Paris price between the seventeenth and
 eighteenth centuries: see Baulant, "Le prix des grains a Paris," pp. 520-40.
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 with hundreds of minuscule actors, the land rental market in any given
 village might involve only a small number of tenants, who could
 conceivably drive rents down and thereby retain some of the profits of
 farming even in the long run. In a few parts of France-areas of
 so-called mauvais gre' or droit de marche"-tenants actually wielded
 such power, but mauvais gre' was unknown throughout most of the area
 where our sample's farms were located.27
 One bit of evidence that might nevertheless be construed as a sign of
 tenant market power is the lower per hectare rent sometimes found on
 big farms and large plots of land, reflecting the possibility that tenants
 able to take on a large farm were powerful enough to force down the
 rent.28 To judge from regressions of ln(rent) on variables affecting rent
 levels (see Table 2, regression 1), even Notre Dame's larger properties
 rented for somewhat less per hectare.
 But it would be wrong to conclude that Notre Dame's tenants pushed
 down the rent, for there is a very different explanation for the lower per
 hectare rent that large plots sometimes fetched, an explanation not
 dependent in the slightest on the market power of tenants. We should
 recall that renting out land, even for a fixed rent, involved risks for the
 early modern landlord. His property might be ruined by neglect, or,
 worse yet, the tenant might fall behind in paying the rent or not pay it
 at all. Such risks were far from insignificant, even for small plots of
 land.29 Because of them, a landlord might have to seek a judgment
 against a tenant or seize his assets. But only the large-scale tenants had
 assets such as livestock or equipment that a landlord could attach. The
 landlord could therefore allow big fermiers to fall into arrears, knowing
 full well that their livestock and equipment served as collateral for their
 debts. With small-scale tenants, however, the landlord had no such
 assurances; his only recourse was to demand a risk premium in the form
 of higher rent.
 Evidence of a different sort also casts doubt on the market power of
 tenants in the Paris Basin. Large-scale tenants in the region commonly
 switched farms during their careers. Their mobility would fit a world in
 which landlords easily introduced new tenants from other villages.
 Tenants also had large families, and though one could perhaps imagine
 collusion between two or three tenant patriarchs in order to depress
 27 Hoffman, "Social History and Agricultural Productivity." A droit de marched did exist in
 certain areas north of Paris: see Postel-Vinay, La rentefonciere, pp. 44-49; and Vinchon, Le livre
 de raison, pp. 36-37, 98-103. But it was largely unknown throughout the rest of the basin, and even
 to the north of Paris it was hardly universal. See Jacquart, "La rente fonciere," p. 375.
 28 Postel-Vinay, La rente fonchere, pp. 35-54; Grantham, "Agricultural Supply," pp. 43-72;
 Bdaur, Le march foncier, pp. 263-64.
 29 Estienne, L'agriculture et la maison rustique, fols. 8-9; L'art d'augmenter son bien, pp.
 10-17, 171-75; Rozier, Cours complet d'agriculture, vol. 2, s.v. "bail"; AN LL 337-38, fols.
 96-101 (1748), fols. 236-37 (1747); LL 350-51, fols. 122-24 (1761-1762); S 242 (1754-1762); S 247
 (1693); S 176 (1666-1669).
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 TABLE 2
 REGRESSIONS WITH LN(RENT) AND LN(TFP)
 Regression number 1 2 3
 Dependent variable ln(rent) ln(TFP) ln(TFP)
 Independent variables
 Constant -11.23 0.079 0.11
 (-16.69) (0.42) (0.60)
 Dummy: years 1775 and after 0.075 0.064 0.056
 (0.60) (1.97) (1.80)
 Dummy: war years 1589 to 1597 -0.097 -0.29 -0.28
 (-0.71) (-8.08) (-8.30)
 Percentage meadow 0.39 0.16 0.11
 (2.09) (3.25) (2.51)
 Percentage vineyard 0.0018 0.014 0.15
 (0.005) (0.13) (1.50)
 Dummy: good soil 0.0050 0.00093 0.0041
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.28)
 ln(distance to Paris in kilometers) -0.27 -0.067 -0.070
 (-6.24) (-5.94) (-5.76)
 Dummy: tenant holdover from previous 0.021 0.019 0.026
 lease (0.42) (1.42) (2.01)
 Time (units of 100 years) 0.91 0.061 0.063
 (23.11) (5.49) (5.82)
 ln(property area in hectares) -0.085 -0.024 -0.050
 (-3.42) (-3.68) (-7.46)
 ln(area per property parcel) 0.043
 (6.91)
 Observations 652 638 581
 R2 0.57 0.31 0.37
 Standard error 0.63 0.17 0.15
 Mean of dependent variable 2.70 0.79 0.80
 Condition number of single-value 87.41 93.46 92.83
 decomposition
 Note: Years before 1520 are omitted; t-statistics are in parentheses. The TFP figures are adjusted
 for taxes.
 Sources: Sample of leases and property descriptions; additional sources are described in Hoffman,
 "Land Rents," appendix 14.
 local rents temporarily, the collusion would in all likelihood break down
 once the patriarchs tried to establish their numerous children on
 farms.30 They would compete with one another to settle their children,
 and their heirs would do the same. Collusion, even if it existed, would
 have been hard to maintain.
 Finally, if tenant dynasties did in fact hold down rents and capture a
 share of the untaxed profits, then rent increases would have been
 significantly lower when the same tenant (or a relative) renewed a lease
 and significantly higher when an outsider was finally installed. But our
 30 Moriceau, "Un systdme de protection sociale." Those tenants who did linger were probably
 the best, retained by the landlord for their mutual benefit.
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 TABLE 3
 REGRESSIONS WITH GROWTH RATE OF RENT AND TFP
 Regression number 1 2 3
 Dependent variable Rent growth TFP growth TFP growth
 rate (percentage rate (percentage rate (percentage
 per year) per year) per year)
 Independent variables
 Constant 1.23 0.46 0.45
 (5.78) (1.32) (1.09)
 Growth rate price-cost ratio 0.61
 (7.26)
 Growth rate of taxes relative to rents -0.44 -4.11 -4.44
 (-0.11) (-2.00) (-2.10)
 Growth rate of Paris population 0.24 0.23
 (6.16) (5.88)
 Dummy: years 1775 and after 1.04 1.03
 (3.48) (3.35)
 Dummy: war years 1589 to 1597 -4.14 -2.44 -2.25
 (-4.85) (-5.85) (-5.19)
 Dummy: repairs -0.31 -0.56
 (-0.85) (-1.39)
 Dummy: tenant holdover from -0.17 -0.085 -0.041
 previous lease (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.29)
 ln(distance to Paris in kilometers) -0.074 -0.083
 (-0.71) (-0.70)
 ln(property area in hectares) -0.024 -0.012
 (-0.43) (-0.18)
 ln(area per parcel) - -0.022
 - - (-0.34)
 Observations 648 648 593
 R 2 0.086 0.20 0.19
 Standard error 3.69 1.68 1.68
 Mean of dependent variable 1.10 0.13 0.13
 Condition number 2.57 14.34 16.63
 Note: Growth rates equal the rate of change of logarithms calculated from lease to lease. The
 price-cost ratio is as in Table 1, and the TFP growth rates are not adjusted for taxes. As is shown
 in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 13, the lack of a tax adjustment will not affect the regression
 coefficients because the growth rate of taxes relative to rents figures among the explanatory
 variables. Years before 1520 are omitted; t-statistics are in parentheses.
 Sources: See Table 2 source notes.
 sample of leases shows that the rent never behaved in such a fashion. If
 we regress the rate at which ln(rent) increased from lease to lease on the
 rate of change in the agricultural price-cost ratio PIC and other variables
 affecting the rent, we find that retaining the same tenant depressed the
 rent by a microscopic and statistically insignificant amount (Table 3,
 regression 1). If a relative of the old tenant renewed the lease, the effect
 was just as small.
 Such a result should not be surprising. Landlords renewed the leases
 every nine years and did so with an eye toward profits. Except in the
 regions of mauvais gre, nothing kept a landlord from eventually finding
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 a new tenant, and with no barriers to entry, tenants could not long
 siphon off profits. One could of course debate the normal entrepreneur-
 ial profits due to tenants. Our assumption is that in the long run the
 competitive rental market would have driven these down to zero,
 leaving tenants no more than what they would earn in the labor market
 and making the cost of the entrepreneurial input equal to the wage rate.
 This assumption is open to criticism, but the evidence for competition in
 the rental market obviously runs in its favor; so too does an eighteenth-
 century analysis of farm earnings, which suggests that entrepreneurial
 profits were minuscule and far too small on the average to affect our
 TFP calculations.31
 Although the use of prices and leases to calculate TFP may now seem
 reasonable, a reader might still like some reassurance that an index of
 TFP based on something so intangible as prices would really yield
 reliable results. In one instance where, thanks to an unusual set of
 family records, we can compare physical quantities produced and
 factors employed for a real eighteenth-century farm in the Paris Basin,
 the method of calculating TFP described here gives extraordinarily
 accurate results. Neither the assumption of constant product and factor
 shares nor the use of prices in place of physical quantities seems to be
 misleading.32
 31 For how rent was set, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 9; for entrepreneurial profits,
 see my appendices 5 and 10. One might still worry that entrepreneurial profits could vary enough
 in the short run to disturb the trend of TFP. The most likely case would be one in which inflation
 in agricultural prices drove up profits before rents could be pushed upward. In such cases, TFP as
 calculated from equation 2 would be negatively correlated with the inflation rate, because with
 inflation we would underestimate the cost of the entrepreneurial input by setting it equal to the
 wage rate, and the higher agricultural prices would then push down our estimate of TFP.
 Fortunately, we can test for such a phenomenon by adding the agricultural inflation rate to
 regressions with ln(TFP). We would expect to find a negative and significant coefficient for the
 inflation rate, but in fact that never occurs, even if we vary the way we measure inflation.
 Moreover, the regression coefficient of the inflation rate implies only a small correction to TFP. It
 is worth noting here that equation 2 does not assume that the land supply is fixed or that the tenant
 farmers were profit maximizers-though without profit maximization, our definition of TFP has no
 necessary connection with technical change. We do have to assume the existence of a large number
 of risk-neutral tenants, but risk neutrality is not an absurd assumption for the sort of wealthy
 fermiers who rented Notre Dame's farms. For them, even profit maximization is not unrealistic.
 For a discussion and other assumptions, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 5.
 32 The example, from data kindly furnished by Gilles Postel-Vinay, concerns the highly
 productive farm that provided our alternative shares. We can compare its productivity in the 1740s
 and 1780s using physical inputs and outputs via a Tornqvist productivity index. The index is
 equivalent to using a translog production function, but it allows us to compare productivity without
 doing regressions. With this technique we find that productivity on the farm rose 9.79 percent
 between the 1740s and the 1780s. If instead we use the method adopted throughout the rest of this
 article-with shares that came from the Bernonville farm-we get very nearly the same thing, 9.03
 percent. Clearly, our price-dual results are close to the primal, or quantity-based, results.
 Moreover, practically none of the difference between the two numbers was caused by the constant
 shares assumption. For details, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 11.
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 FIGURE 3
 LN(TFP) FOR ALTERNATIVE PRICES AND SHARES
 (ADJUSTED FOR TAXES AND LAND QUALITY)
 THE NOTRE DAME PROPERTIES
 Productivity trends
 What then do the leases reveal? The place to begin is with the
 evolution of TFP. From equation 2, TFP equals (r + t)sC/P, where r is
 per hectare rent; t is per hectare taxes; s is the factor share of land; and
 C and P are the indexes of agricultural costs and prices. We do not know
 t precisely, but if we ignore taxes for the moment-an oversight soon to
 be corrected-then the logarithm of TFP will be very nearly equal to
 sln(r) - In(P/C), which we can average across properties for different
 periods. We can then chart, at least roughly, the changes in TFP, and we
 can hone the accuracy of the graph by adjusting In(r) for variations in
 land quality via the procedure used in Table 1.
 Figure 3 plots such an average for 25-year periods. It also charts
 average values of TFP computed with the alternative factor and product
 shares and with the alternative prices in the indexes P and C-prices
 that are averaged over the newly signed lease instead of over the
 outgoing one. All three curves are corrected for variations in land
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 quality and location.33 The alternative shares and prices shift the graph
 of TFP somewhat but do not disturb the overall trend. The alternative
 shares tip the curve upward a bit-largely because the land share s is
 higher-but TFP still traces out the same peaks and valleys. The pattern
 with the alternative prices is also similar, except in 1650/74 and 1775/89,
 when its behavior may well be a fluke.34 Overall, TFP follows essen-
 tially the same path, whatever the shares and prices.
 Built into Figure 3 is an adjustment for having omitted taxes in the
 calculation of TFP. Without such a correction, TFP growth would be
 understated, because of the increasingly heavy fiscal burden that the
 monarchy imposed on the land. The size of the resulting error, though,
 turns out to be relatively small. Figure 3 plots TFP both before and after
 the tax adjustment for the Bernonville shares and for prices averaged
 over the outgoing lease. The graphs of TFP with alternative shares and
 prices include tax adjustments of a similar magnitude.35
 The years from 1450 to 1519 have been excluded from Figure 3,
 because the prices needed for the indexes C and P become less reliable
 and the number of usable leases dwindles. As is well known, this earlier
 period witnessed a recovery from the devastation wrought by the
 Hundred Years' War. Tenants reoccupied abandoned farms, rebuilt
 walls and barns, and cleared fields overgrown with weeds. The process
 3 One alternative would be to average sln(r) and In(P/C) separately, taking the mean of sln(r)
 over all the leases in each 25-year period and then subtracting In(P/C) averaged over all the years
 in the period, rather than over all the leases. This procedure, though, yields results nearly
 indistinguishable from simply averaging In(TFP) lease by lease; see Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendix 12, for a discussion. We could also average In(TFP) by decade, but the decennial
 averages obscure the trend. Finally, though it might seem promising to chart TFP for clusters of
 properties (the landlocked ones north of Paris, for example) or to single out farms with high rates
 of TFP growth, in the end neither technique proved illuminating.
 34 In 1650/74 the TFP index with alternative prices is inflated-perhaps artificially-because it
 employs prices eight years into the future; it thus incorporates the depressed prices of the 1670s,
 when P/C is very low (Table 1, column 5). Its jump in 1775/89 may also be a fluke. As our prices
 series stops in 1789, we cannot really incorporate prices eight years forward; rather, we have to
 calculate P/C in the late 1780s with prices from only a few years in the late 1780s, making the
 alternative price estimates suspect.
 35 As TFP equals (r + t)sCIP, omitting taxes t, as we have, would tend to understate both the
 level and the growth rate of TFP, if taxes were rising relative to rents. The precise taxes t for each
 piece of property will never be known precisely, but one reasonable assumption is that for the ith
 property the fraction of gross rent (that is, rent plus taxes) going to the landlord rather than to the
 fisc is g, where ln(g) equals b ln(ta/ra) + c;. Here b is a negative constant, ta is the average per capita
 tax assessment, ra is the average per hectare rent, and c; is a constant that varies from property to
 property. Under this assumption, which amounts to saying that taxes were apportioned with an eye
 toward average rent and population levels, we can estimate the magnitude of the error involved in
 omitting taxes from the formula for TFP. The way to do so, shown in Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendix 13, is to regress the growth rate of TFP measured without taxes on the growth rate of
 ta/ra, which we can derive from tax receipts, population statistics, and average rent levels. We then
 subtract the product of the growth rate of ta/ra and its regression coefficient from the measured
 growth rate of TFP in order to correct the measured growth rate of TFP for the omission of taxes.
 To adjust the measured level of TFP, we subtract the same regression coefficient times In(talra).
 Table 3, column 2, contains the necessary regression; the error involved in ignoring taxes turns out
 to be very small, particularly in the case of the growth rate of TFP. See my appendix 13 for details.
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 of reconstruction swept on well into the sixteenth century, particularly
 in villages that were cursed with poor soil or situated far from Paris. As
 late as 1545, for example, Notre Dame was still clearing land in the
 village of La-Grande-Paroisse 77 kilometers to the southeast of Paris,
 where one of its tenants, Jean Godet, had to reclaim nine hectares of
 briar-choked meadow. Godet also had to enclose the meadow with
 ditches to keep wandering animals out, evidence that the process had
 extended beyond mere rebuilding to become one of general improve-
 ment to the soil.36
 If the wave of improvements persisted well into the sixteenth century,
 it might explain the relatively high levels of TFP we observe in 1550/74
 (Figure 3). Investment hidden in improvements would boost rents and
 thereby appear-somewhat erroneously-as higher TFP. It would also
 explain the rapid pace of TFP growth. Between 1520/24 and 1550/74,
 TFP grew between 0.3 and 0.4 percent a year, a brilliant achievement by
 early modern standards and, as we shall see, one that compares
 favorably with the English performance even two centuries later.37
 In all likelihood, however, the cause of the higher productivity in
 1550/74 lies elsewhere than in recuperation and improvements after the
 Hundred Years' War. In the first place, information contained in the
 leases often allows us to deduct the portion of the rent that reflects
 improvements, at least when buildings are concerned. When it is
 deducted, the rent and consequently the TFP estimates hardly change.
 One could argue that clearing and other investments in land would not
 leave a trace in the leases, but clearing was unlikely to have continued
 after 1550, particularly on properties close to Paris, where the TFP
 increases in the middle of the century were largest. The farms near Paris
 had suffered much less during the Hundred Years' War, and they would
 in any case have been rebuilt during the fifteenth century, not as late as
 1550 nor even after 1525.38 Evidently, some other force was pushing
 TFP upward in the mid-sixteenth century, a force that waxed stronger
 near Paris. Perhaps it was the opportunities offered by proximity to a
 large city-a point to which we shall return.
 After the heights of 1550/74, TFP plummeted during the Wars of
 Religion of the late sixteenth century. If we compute the growth rate of
 TFP from lease to lease and average it across properties, we see that it
 too dropped, confirming the dismal picture at the close of the iS00s.39
 Between 1550/74 and 1575/99, TFP fell 5 percent or more, depending on
 which shares and prices we employ.
 36 See AN S 407 (1464); S 272 (1522, 1545); and S 409 (1479, 1482, 1483, 1498, 1511). Compare
 with Fourquin, Les campagnes, pp. 389-97, 430-531, map 5.
 37 The 0.3 to 0.4 percent range covers the growth rates one gets with all the various shares and
 prices.
 38 Fourquin, Les campagnes, pp. 389-97, 430-531; and Jacquart, La crise rurale, pp. 42-47.
 39 See Hoffman, "Land Rents," fig. A-3.
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 The cause of the collapse was undoubtedly war. The decline was
 steepest during and immediately after the years 1589 to 1594, the period
 of most intense fighting in the Paris Basin, when undisciplined armies
 traversed the region sowing devastation in their wake. During these
 accursed years soldiers wreaked the greatest havoc: not content to
 trample crops, seize livestock and grain, and burn farm buildings to the
 ground, they resorted to extortion and kidnapping and completely
 disrupted trade. Understandably, many a farmer fled, abandoning his
 farm to weeds or to pillage. Notre Dame's tenant Bernaye quit his lease
 in La Grande Paroisse in 1594 because of attacks by soldiers, and
 warfare left Notre Dame's farm in Dampmart abandoned and ruined in
 1597. During the worst period of anarchy and plunder, TFP dropped by
 perhaps 25 percent.40
 Such were the heavy consequences of war. To be sure, the index of
 TFP might seem ill suited for gauging the effects of such transitory
 events, as it was designed to measure only long-term trends. Yet the
 evidence suggests that the plunge of TFP during the Wars of Religion
 was in fact real. What pushed TFP down in the 1590s was not a decline
 in rent but a sharp upswing in agricultural prices (Table 1). Those
 leaping prices were a direct result of markets disrupted and products
 destroyed.41
 Productivity growth increased sharply in the peaceful opening years
 of the seventeenth century. Then, in the second quarter of the century,
 TFP again declined (Figure 3). The drop probably resulted from the
 heavy taxes imposed to fund the kingdom's involvement in the Thirty
 Years' War. Our TFP figures were of course adjusted for taxes, but the
 adjustment concerned only that portion of the farm profits or surplus
 that went to the fisc instead of to the landlord. Skyrocketing taxes also
 could have wreaked havoc by disrupting the agrarian economy. Tax
 increases, after all, pushed peasants into debt and led to the frequent
 seizure of livestock and other agricultural capital for the payment of
 back taxes. Along with troop movements during the Fronde rebellion
 and a series of disastrous harvests in the early 1630s, the tax-provoked
 40 See AN LL 329-30, La-Grande-Paroisse (1594); S 242 (June 25, 1597); and Jacquart, La rise
 rurale, pp. 171-207. The 25 percent decline in TFP comes from Table 2, regression 2, which is
 discussed later.
 41 The regression with In(rent) also suggests that rising prices, rather than declining rents, lay
 behind the drop in TFP, as the dummy variable for the war years 1589 to 1597 does not have a large
 or significant coefficient (Table 2, regression 1). The chief argument against the reality of the TFP
 drop would run something like this: The 1589/90 siege of Paris might have temporarily driven up the
 Paris grain prices that figure in our index P (thereby depressing TFP), even though farm gate prices
 and true TFP in fact remained the same. But the index P averages prices for the current year and
 for the eight years of the previous lease; it is therefore unlikely to be swayed unduly by any single
 year of crisis. Furthermore, some local markets show the same spike in prices in 1589/90 as does
 Paris, suggesting that the price increase was not confined to the city (see Jacquart, La crise rurale,
 p. 765). As it turns out, we observe the same decline of TFP with the alternative shares and prices.
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 disruptions fit the chronology of declining TFP in 1625/49 and no doubt
 lay behind it.42
 The following century witnessed a recovery and then slow growth. At
 least a part of the apparent gains in the century after 1650 was in fact a
 mirage, reflecting a decline in transportation costs rather than increased
 agricultural productivity. The cost of transport, we recall, drove a
 wedge between farm gate prices and Paris prices for bulky commodities
 such as grain and thus progressively reduced rents on land farther from
 the city. Because our calculation of TFP is based on Paris prices, and
 because the measure of TFP combines low local rents with high Paris
 grain prices, we undoubtedly underestimate the absolute level of TFP
 for farms distant from the city. The reason again is the simple fact that
 local rents adjust to transportation costs and local prices, not to the
 higher prices prevailing in Paris.
 As long as local grain prices moved in parallel with Paris prices-the
 usual pattern-there would be no cause for worry. Although absolute
 levels of TFP might err slightly, trends in productivity and rates of
 productivity growth would be the same. But over the course of the late
 seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, local prices in markets such
 as Pontoise and Soissons rose slightly to approach those prevailing in
 Paris, and the gap between the Paris price and the local prices closed.43
 What was happening was that transportation costs were dropping.
 The increase in local prices relative to the Paris price was more
 pronounced the farther markets were from Paris, just as we would
 expect if the cost of transportation were falling. Such declining costs
 were themselves a mark of increased productivity, but in transportation
 rather than in farming.44 Unfortunately, our measure of TFP would
 mistakenly confound the two. Rents would increase as local grain prices
 converged to meet the Paris price, but as we would be judging rents
 relative to a Paris price index P, it would seem as if TFP were rising,
 particularly on distant farms where the effect of declining transportation
 costs was most conspicuous. It was precisely on such farms that the
 productivity gains in the late seventeenth century seemed largest.
 Prices in markets outside of Paris can therefore reveal how much of
 the TFP growth between 1650/74 and 1750/74 actually resulted from
 42 Jacquart, La rise rurale, pp. 623-99.
 43 Meuvret, Subsistances, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 116-34; Baulant, "Le prix des grains"; AN F 11 207
 (Soissons price, corrected following the indications in Goubert, Beauvais, vol. 1, p. 408); and
 Dupaquier, Mercuriales. Graphs of the Soissons and Pontoise prices show that they rose roughly
 5 to 10 percent relative to the Paris price between 1650 and 1750, with more of an increase in distant
 Soissons than in Pontoise.
 44 For direct evidence of declining costs of transportation, see Letaconnoux, "Les transports en
 France au 18e siecle," pp. 97-114, 269-92. Part of the transportation improvements undoubtedly
 involved the arduous task of establishing networks of specialized middlemen, a subject I shall
 pursue in a forthcoming book. Separating agriculture and transportation here is, of course,
 somewhat artificial because much of the grain was carted to market by the farmers themselves.
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 declining costs of transportation and from the concomitant rise in local
 prices. Let us consider, for instance, a market far from Paris, where the
 shift in grain prices relative to those in Paris was large. Soissons
 provides a perfect example: at nearly 100 kilometers from Paris, it was
 farther away than any of the properties in our sample. Not surprisingly,
 the increase of grain prices in Soissons relative to Paris accounts for an
 8.3 percent rise in our measure of TFP between 1650/74 and 1750/74,
 roughly three-quarters of the 11.3 percent gain we observe if we
 compute TFP with the Bernonville shares and with prices averaged over
 the outgoing lease.45
 Closer to Paris, the convergence of local prices and the Paris price has
 much less effect on our measurement of TFP. At a market such as
 Pontoise, approximately 30 kilometers from Paris, the convergence of
 prices explains only a 3.6 percent increase in the same TFP measure
 over the same period. Clearly, Pontoise provides the example relevant
 to our sample of properties, for they lie on the average a little less than
 40 kilometers from the city, not 100 kilometers away. Between 1650/74
 and 1750/74, then, true agricultural TFP grew by perhaps only 7.7
 percent-the other 3.6 percent we measure resulted from better trans-
 portation. Improved transportation should not, of course, be slighted: it
 helped feed the growing city of Paris as much as did more efficient
 farms.
 After the century of slow growth, TFP finally accelerated in the late
 eighteenth century (Figure 3). Between 1750/74 and 1775/89 TFP
 vaulted 6.5 percent, measured with the Bernonville shares and outgoing
 prices. The spike at the end of the Old Regime is even more pronounced
 if we look at rates of growth. They averaged more than 0.3 percent a
 year between 1750/74 and 1775/89 and reached a peak of more than 1
 percent-rates comparable or superior to those achieved across the
 English Channel. Indeed, in the early eighteenth century, when TFP
 growth in English agriculture seemed to crest, it was gaining 0.6 percent
 annually, according to N. F. R. Crafts; later in the century, he
 estimated, the growth rate was only 0.2 percent. Robert Allen's work on
 the English Midlands points to a similar range: between 0.2 and 0.3
 percent over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.46 Agriculture in
 the Paris Basin was thus hardly lagging behind England; in fact, its
 performance seems positively buoyant.
 But was the late eighteenth-century increase in TFP in the Paris Basin
 illusory? Did it, at least in part, mirror declining transportation costs, as
 did the slow growth in the years before 1750? The answer this time is no.
 In the first place, after 1775 our index of TFP rose no faster on distant
 45 Prices at Rozay-en-Brie suggest a similarly large role for transportation in the period between
 1650/74 and 1725/45, when the Rozay price series unfortunately stops.
 46 See Crafts, British Economic Growth, pp. 83-85; and Allen, "The Growth of Labor
 Productivity. "
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 properties than on those near Paris-the opposite of what one would
 expect given declining transport costs. Local prices, moreover, had by
 1750 ceased rising relative to the Paris price, and their movement no
 longer accounted for any of the increase in TFP. Prices in Soissons
 explain perhaps a 1.8 percent increase in our measure of TFP between
 1750/74 and 1775/89; those in Pontoise-the ones relevant to our
 sample-explain none at all.
 It is true that the measure of TFP used here may lag a bit behind
 reality. It took time to renew a lease, time to determine that a tenant was
 thriving and that the rent could be ratcheted upward. A wise landlord
 might wait before demanding more from his tenant, lest the tenant go
 bankrupt and the landlord receive nothing. Notre Dame, for example,
 investigated several tenants in the late 1750s, discovered that they were
 profiting, and ruled out the prospect of bankruptcy. Only then did it
 raise the rent. If such a pattern were general, the increase in produc-
 tivity could have begun earlier than the graphs suggest.47
 Whether the upturn began slightly earlier or not, nothing suggests that
 the eighteenth-century jump in TFP was peculiar to the properties
 owned by Notre Dame. Nominal rent increases of 79 to 120 percent
 between the 1730s and 1780s were common in Ile-de-France, Picardy,
 and the Beauce. On the Notre Dame farms the increase was 105 percent
 (Table 1, column 2). Because the trend of prices and taxes was similar
 throughout the environs of Paris, TFP must have grown by a like
 amount on farms throughout the region.48
 Regression Results
 Regression analysis based on individual leases corroborates this
 three-century story of productivity change and helps us refine our
 results. In the regressions the dependent variables are the logarithm of
 TFP and its growth rate, both calculated lease by lease. Here ln(TFP) is
 computed from equation 2 using Bernonville shares, prices averaged
 over the outgoing lease, and rent without an adjustment for land quality.
 Alternative prices and shares yield similar results, and we can correct
 4 See AN S 242 (1754-1762, Dampmart); and S 282 (1746-1755), S 460 (1782) (La-Grande-
 Paroisse).
 48 Bdaur, Le marched foncier, pp. 262-68; Bertrandy-Lacabane, Bretigny-sur-Orge, pp. 314-15;
 and Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere." Historians might wonder
 whether increased competition among tenants or improved accounting by landlords (an outgrowth
 perhaps of the oft-discussed "feudal" reaction in the eighteenth century) allowed landlords to
 squeeze more from their tenants in the late eighteenth century, thus explaining the rent increase we
 observe. The problem with such an argument is that there is no sign of increased turnover among
 tenants in the late eighteenth century, which we would expect with increased competition among
 tenants or excessive pressure from landlords. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of
 pressure on tenants in earlier periods as well. I will discuss these issues at greater length in a
 forthcoming book.
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 for land quality and for the use of Paris prices by including quality and
 locational measures among the explanatory variables.49
 The regression with ln(TFP) confirms that TFP plunged during the
 worst phase of the Wars of Religion. The coefficient of the dummy
 variable for the terrible years from 1589 to 1597 (the period of most
 intense fighting around Paris plus the following three-year crop cycle)
 translates into a 25 percent drop in TFP, and the t-statistic is too large
 for it to be a fluke (Table 2, regression 2). Similarly, TFP really does
 jump after 1775-by 6.6 percent, if we judge from the coefficient of the
 variable for the years after 1775. As for the rest of the three centuries,
 the coefficient of the year, which averages TFP growth outside the
 periods from 1589 to 1597 and from 1775 to 1789, is certainly consistent
 with our story of rapid gains in the early sixteenth century, a sharp
 recovery after 1589 to 1597, a crisis in 1625 to 1650, and slow growth for
 the following century.50
 As does the analysis of local prices in the seventeenth and eighteenth
 centuries, the regressions also argue against interpreting the increase in
 our TFP index exclusively as a decline in transportation costs. If falling
 transportation costs alone were to explain all the growth of our index of
 TFP, then the rate of change of TFP would seem higher farther away
 from Paris. It would be on the distant properties that local prices would
 rise the most, and rents would follow in their wake. We would therefore
 expect to measure higher rates of TFP growth on distant properties and
 hence a positive coefficient for the logarithm of the distance to Paris in
 the regressions with the rate of change of TFP (Table 3, regression 2).
 Yet such is not the case. The coefficient is insignificant and negative,
 and while transportation was growing more efficient, farming did the
 same.
 49 For the regressions with alternative shares and prices, see Hoffman, "Land Rents,"
 appendices 6 and 9. In Table 2, the level of TFP includes a correction for taxes, but in Table 3 the
 TFP growth rate does not. The coefficients in Table 3 will not be affected by the failure to correct
 for taxes, because the growth rate of taxes relative to rents appears among the explanatory
 variables. See my appendix 13 for an explanation. The TFP growth rate regressions also include a
 dummy variable for ongoing repairs and for tenants who repeat from previous leases, which
 corrects for any market power that repeat tenants may have exercised. Finally, though one might
 argue for regressing nominal or real rents on prices and wages, the regressions swiftly bog down in
 multicollinearity, and in any event it is not uncommon to regress productivity indexes on
 explanatory variables. For an example, see Allen, "Efficiency."
 50 One cause for worry is the large value of the condition number, a sign of multicollinearity.
 Although multicollinearity may therefore cast some doubt on the results with ln(TFP), it does not
 afflict the regression with the TFP growth rate, which points to the same dip in 1589 to 1597 and to
 the same sharp increase after 1775 (Table 3, regression 2). According to the coefficients, the TFP
 growth rate fell 2.4 percentage points between 1589 and 1597 and soared a point after 1775. And
 everything else in the regression fits our story, too. For the condition number and multicollinearity,
 see Judge et al., The Theory and Practice of Econometrics, pp. 896-904. The sample of leases
 showed no signs of heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation; for details, see Hoffman, "Social History
 and Agricultural Productivity," p. 17.
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 EXPLAINING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
 What then explains the slow growth in TFP that we saw in the years
 between 1650 and 1750-or the rapid increases we observed in the
 sixteenth century, the early seventeenth century, and again after 1775?
 Part of the growth in 1650 to 1750 reflected improved transportation, and
 the surge in the early seventeenth century signaled a recovery after the
 Wars of Religion. But what of the other periods of rapid growth? The
 answer does not lie with a social or technological revolution, for nothing
 of the kind happened before 1789. No wave of enclosures depopulated
 the countryside, and no mechanical revolution or drastic change of
 crops transformed farming, even at the end of the eighteenth century.
 What change there was probably reflected the opportunities made
 possible by the proximity of Paris and its growing market. The evidence
 thus fits the story, told by several historians, that stresses urban markets
 in explaining agricultural gains before the technological upheavals of the
 late nineteenth century.
 In the region of our sample, we can begin to discern how agriculture
 benefited from proximity to Paris and from the resultant opportunities
 for trade that transportation costs would rule out in other, less urban-
 ized areas. The productivity gains on our sample properties did not
 necessarily stem from dramatically higher yields-evidence about the
 evolution of yields in the Paris Basin is in any case unclear-but the
 gains seem to have been at least in part a response to the increasing
 animal populations in the city. The horses that pulled the newly
 invented carriages of the privileged and brought food to the officials of
 the growing state drove up the price of forage and encouraged the
 production of additional animal feed on grain farms close to the city.
 Early on, farmers planted artificial meadows to nourish their own
 livestock and then carted their oats, straw, and hay to Paris. They might
 then return with loads of manure to spread on their fields, releasing them
 from the terrible constraint that the lack of fertilizer had imposed on
 traditional agriculture and boosting their grain yields. These changes all
 tended to be piecemeal and accomplished on a small scale-in the
 corner of a field here, on a parcel of land there-rather than on entire
 farms. They thus did not upset the agricultural technology. Nonethe-
 less, they sufficed to push TFP upward.51
 The regressions substantiate the important role played by proximity
 to Paris and by the city's growth. Multicollinearity precludes adding the
 population of Paris to the regressions with the logarithm of TFP, but the
 growth rate of the urban population appears to have had a large effect on
 51 The previous two paragraphs depend on Chevet, "Le Marquisat d'Ormesson"; Grantham,
 "The Diffusion of the New Husbandry"; Grantham, "Agricultural Supply"; Jacquart, La crise
 rurale, pp. 321-30; Meuvret, Subsistances; and Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, Ferme, firme et
 famille. That soil quality has no effect on rent or on TFP (Table 2, regressions 1 and 2) is consistent
 with this story: near Paris enough manure was available to make up for soil differences.
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 the growth rate of TFP (Table 3, regression 2). In the early seventeenth
 century, for example, when the population of Paris was gaining 1.3
 percent annually-rapid growth by contemporary standards-it added
 0.3 percent to the rate of increase of TFP, also a large amount in the
 early modern world.52 One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility
 that rising TFP made possible a larger urban population and not vice
 versa, but the evidence is at least consistent with the city's being a
 motor of agricultural growth.
 Small farm size has been invoked repeatedly to explain the failings of
 French agriculture ever since the days of Arthur Young, and it is
 important to know whether farm size or consolidation affected TFP
 growth in the Paris area. Large size (as measured by the logarithm of
 property area) actually diminishes rent and thus our measure of TFP,
 but the effect, we have argued, is merely the risk premium demanded of
 small-scale tenants (Table 2, regressions 1 and 2). If we add to the
 regression a somewhat crude measure of consolidation (the logarithm of
 the number of hectares per property parcel), it does seem to boost the
 level of TFP, but the coefficient could be an artifact of multicollinearity
 (Table 2, regression 3). More convincing perhaps are growth rate
 regressions, where multicollinearity poses no problems. There, neither
 the size of the property nor its consolidation seems to affect TFP's
 advance (Table 3, regressions 2 and 3).
 Yet we must be careful here. All that the growth rate regressions
 really imply is that no long-run obstacles blocked the enlargement or
 amalgamation of properties. To understand why, we must realize that
 properties were frequently consolidated by tenants who rented land
 from different landlords. Although the properties were distinct, the
 tenant operated them together. When Andre-Paul Hanoteau and his
 wife leased Notre Dame's 30-hectare property in Le-Tremblay-les-
 Gonesse in 1784, for example, it was not the only land they farmed.
 Indeed, they worked a total of several hundred hectares in Le-Trem-
 blay-les-Gonesse and its environs.53 In the eighteenth century such
 arrangements-known as cumul de baux-grew increasingly common
 and seemed to capture economies of scale. The practice allowed a
 tenant to economize on buildings, equipment, and certain tasks.54 And
 52 Urban growth rates are based on de Vries, European Urbanization.
 5 Hanoteau died in 1785 and, according to the tax roll of that year, farmed 224 hectares. Records
 of his estate suggest that he farmed even more-some 400 hectares. I thank Gilles Postel-Vinay and
 Jean-Marc Moriceau for furnishing this information.
 5 In the eighteenth century, Notre Dame wanted to suppress the buildings on properties no
 longer large enough to be economical as farms: see AN LL 332 (1761-1762, Larchant); and S 320
 (June 26, 1780, Lizy-sur-Ourcq). One sign of the greater frequency of cumul de baux was that the
 leases began to carry a clause acknowledging it: see AN S 324A (June 25, 1781, Le-Mesnil-Amelot);
 and S 407 (Aug. 25, 1785, Viercy). For early consolidation, see Jacquart, La crise rurale, pp.
 340-48, and for an excellent example, see Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, Ferme, firme et famille.
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 it permitted him to spread his skills as an overseer-an important part of
 early modern farming-over multiple properties.
 Notre Dame had so much land that it could occasionally effect a
 consolidation by leasing two of its own properties to the same tenant.
 An examination of such consolidations shows some failures but also
 some striking successes, as in La-Grande-Paroisse in the early seven-
 teenth century, where TFP gained 6 percent.55 Further evidence
 emerges from surviving rural tax rolls, which by the late eighteenth
 century routinely carried information about the total acreage a tenant
 farmed. Taxes were generally paid by tenants rather than absentee
 landlords, and the assessments in any given year turn out to be very
 nearly proportional to the total acreage the tenant worked. Assessments
 can thus serve as a proxy for the amount of land under the tenant's
 direction. If we compare various tenants' tax assessments for two fixed
 periods, the change in assessment will give a relative measure of the
 increase in the scale of their farming operations. To be sure, the overall
 tax rate would have changed over the intervening period, but the
 assessment increase would still yield a relative measure of how much
 more land a tenant farmed. If he took on additional hectares, his
 assessment would rise faster than the tax rate. If not, his assessment
 would merely keep pace with the tax rate.
 This ability to employ changes in tax assessments as a proxy for
 changes in farm scale lets us use the tax rolls from the 1740s, when, at
 least near Paris, taxes still seemed proportional to the area a tenant
 farmed even though the areas themselves rarely appeared on the rolls.
 For a small number of properties we can find tenants' assessments in
 both 1740/41 and 1783/89. If we plot how much the tax assessment
 changed for each property between 1740/41 and 1783/89 on a logarithmic
 scale versus how much the logarithm of TFP changed for the same
 property over the same period, the relationship between the scale of a
 tenant's operation and TFP stands out clearly, even though we are
 dealing with only seven properties (Figure 4).6
 Again, the overall tax rate per hectare had shifted between 1740/41
 and 1783/89, but the change in taxes for a given property still yields a
 relative measure of how much more land the later tenant farmed. In
 55 AN LL 329-30; S 272; and S 273 (1636-1654).
 56 For the tax rolls, see Guerout, Roles de la taille. A search at the Archives Nationales turned
 up tax assessments for 44 tenants in the series Z IG, and those assessments bore out the close
 relationship between the amount of the assessment and the number of hectares the tenant farmed.
 Tax assessments may have been misleading in earlier periods and in other regions, but here they
 seem a reliable guide to the acreage farmed. However, I was able to get leases and usable tax
 assessments for only seven of the properties in both 1740/41 and 1783/89. When more than one tax
 assessment was available for a property in 1740/41 or in 1783/89, I averaged the logarithm of the
 different assessments for each period. There is no tax correction in Figure 4; for an explanation, see
 Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 13. Figure 4 here differs slightly from an analogous graph in
 Hoffman, "Social History and Agricultural Productivity," because of the addition of new data.
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 Le-Tremblay-les-Gonesse, for example, the scale of the tenant's oper-
 ation grew appreciably between 1740/41 and 1783/89. Until 1741, a
 struggling Mathieu Bignon had been farming Notre Dame's property in
 Le-Tremblay, along with roughly 30 hectares of his own. But by the
 early 1780s, we know, the property was farmed by Andre-Paul Hano-
 teau, who worked much more land. The increased acreage had boosted
 the tenant's taille assessment in the intervening years, and the TFP of
 the property marched in step, climbing 14 percent.57
 57 AN Z IG 291B (1740), 292B (1741), 431A (1786), and 451B (1789). As Hanoteau died in 1785,
 I had to use his widow's tax assessment for 1786 and 1789; using his own assessment for 1785 would
 not have changed matters appreciably. As with all the properties, the change in ln(TFP) here was
 computed between the years 1732/45 and 1777/89. Such long periods had to be chosen because of
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 Apparently amalgamation via cumul de baux did increase productiv-
 ity: evidence that farm size mattered. The fact that our measures of
 property size and of property consolidation had no noticeable positive
 effect in the regressions merely implies that the amalgamation of
 properties encountered few obstacles, at least in the eighteenth century.
 Otherwise, the large properties, in effect already consolidated, would
 have enjoyed a great advantage, and the coefficients of property size and
 property consolidation would be large and positive in our TFP growth
 rate regressions. To operate a larger farm, tenants simply amalgamated
 properties and did so without difficulty, so that the distribution of the
 true farm size was independent of the distribution of property size.
 Under such conditions, property size would not be expected to play a
 significant role in the TFP regressions even if there were increasing
 returns to scale in farming.
 Size and consolidation thus mattered, but near Paris, at least, there
 were few obstacles to achieving the appropriate scale. Perhaps this
 scale increased over time, particularly in the eighteenth century. It is
 true that attempts to amalgamate properties before the eighteenth
 century had often failed. Perhaps the skills needed to run a large farm
 had been scarce in the earlier centuries, when few farmers could
 mobilize the necessary capital or keep the requisite farm accounts. For
 the farmer with the requisite skills and capital, though, nothing blocked
 the way. Communal property rights were no barrier to amalgamation;
 neither was the village community. Had they in fact hindered amalga-
 mation, as historians frequently claim, the coefficients of property size
 and property consolidation would have been positive in the TFP growth
 rate regressions.
 Weighing the various factors that boosted TFP is treacherous, but we
 can at least advance some crude guesses for the eighteenth century.
 Between 1725/49 and 1775/89, TFP climbed roughly 9 percent, if we
 compute TFP with the Bernonville shares and with prices averaged over
 the outgoing lease. Perhaps 1 percent derived from improved transpor-
 tation, leaving 8 percent that reflected the growth of agricultural outputs
 relative to the factors of production.
 Total land and livestock use seem not to have changed appreciably,
 but the farm accounts analyzed by Postel-Vinay and Moriceau suggest
 that the amount of agricultural labor employed fell by about 6 percent
 between 1725/49 and 1775/89, probably because of farm amalgamation.
 The 6 percent drop would account for a 2 percent TFP gain. As for
 outputs, animal products in all likelihood remained static, but the
 the volatility of rent payments and because the leases in force in the years 1740/41 and 1783/89 had
 been drawn up as early as 1732 and 1777.
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 evolution of grain yields is uncertain. On the one hand, Jean Meuvret
 and others have suggested that there was no increase in yields near Paris
 in the eighteenth century and hence no role for grain output in the
 growth of TFP. On the other, George Grantham has proposed a 15
 percent rise in wheat yields between 1750 and 1800, which translates
 into a 6 percent TFP gain over our period. Grantham's estimate fits the
 numbers proposed by other recent scholars, and if we accept it, then
 together with the decline in the use of labor we can account for nearly
 all the progress of TFP.58
 Whatever the causes, it is in any case clear that Old Regime
 agriculture was capable of noteworthy growth, at least near Paris.
 Admittedly, the region was the most commercialized part of the
 kingdom, and no other French city could generate the same opportuni-
 ties for trade. And the innovations that spurred on productivity
 growth-among them the planting of artificial meadows and the consol-
 idation of properties-faced fewer hurdles in the Paris region than they
 did elsewhere. Nonetheless, the performance of agriculture near Paris
 was still stunning. As early as the sixteenth century, local farmers
 outdid their English counterparts at the task of economic growth, and
 the progress they achieved was particularly dramatic in the late eigh-
 teenth century-not what historians would normally expect for the eve
 of the Revolution.
 The problem was that the French could not sustain their productivity
 increases. Their gains in the early sixteenth century were dashed by the
 Wars of Religion; their recovery in the early seventeenth century was
 sapped by military taxes and the Fronde. In the end, agriculture near
 Paris suffered grievously from those setbacks. Whereas in the English
 Midlands farmers maintained productivity growth rates of 0.2 to 0.3
 percent over a full two centuries, in the Paris Basin they managed only
 0.1 or perhaps 0.2 percent over the long haul. They could push their
 farms at better than 0.3 percent for 50 or even 75 years, but an
 exogenous crisis would soon cut short their advances.59 In the end, it
 took them three centuries to accomplish what the English did in two.
 Their productivity, it appears, was hardly static and unchanging;
 indeed, it proved all too flighty. It moved up and down, dancing to a
 rhythm set by a variety of forces. Among them we must count not only
 the opportunities for trade on the outskirts of a large city but the baleful
 consequences of war.
 58 Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, Ferme, firme etfamille; Meuvret, Subsistances, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp.
 194-203; Grantham, "The Growth of Labour Productivity." Chevet, in "Le Marquisat d'Ormes-
 son," proposes even larger yield increases than does Grantham.
 59 Figures for the Midlands are derived from Allen, "The Growth of Labor Productivity." TFP
 in the Midlands advanced perhaps 30 to 60 percent between 1600 and 1800. In the Paris Basin it
 took a century longer-from 1500 to 1789-to grow as much.
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